Religious Education in Schools: The crisis in State–Church relations in Poland

By Rev. Prof. Piotr Stanisz*

In 1990, religious education returned to Polish schools after a period in which the school system was subordinated to the ideological premises of the socialist state. For many, this return was seen as a necessary step in the process of democratization and normalization—not only in State–Church relations but also in public life in general. In 1991, the Act on the School Education System required schools to provide religious instruction upon the request of parents or students themselves. The law also authorized the Minister of Education to issue, “in agreement with the authorities of the Catholic Church, the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and other churches and religious denominations,” a regulation containing organizational guidelines (interpreted quite broadly). With only minor, non-essential modifications, the 1992 ministerial regulation ensured appropriate conditions for religious education (not only Catholic) in Polish schools for over thirty years. Meanwhile, the 1997 Constitution expressly allowed religious teaching in schools, settling debates over whether school-based religious instruction was compatible with the State–Church separation principle. Additionally, in the 1993 Concordat—ratified in 1998—the Republic of Poland guaranteed that Catholic religious education would be provided in accordance with the wishes of those concerned.

However, the presence of religious education in school curricula—particularly the public funding of teachers for this subject—has faced opposition for years. In the early years following the decision to reintroduce religious education in schools, the Constitutional Tribunal was called upon twice to rule on various issues related to this instruction [decisions of January 30, 1991 (K 11/90) and April 20, 1993 (U 12/92)]. The matter resurfaced in 2009 with another ruling on December 2, 2009 (U 10/07). Strasbourg institutions have also examined Polish cases concerning (either explicitly or implicitly) the methods of delivering religious education on three occasions [the Commission’s decision of January 16, 1996, in the case of C.J., J.J., and E.J. (23380/94); the Court’s decision of June 26, 2001, in the case of Saniewski (40319/98); and the Court’s ruling of June 15, 2010, in the case of Grzelak (7710/02)].

In December 2023, following the parliamentary elections in October, a new broad coalition government was formed in Poland, led by Civic Platform leader Donald Tusk, after eight years of rule by Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) under Jarosław Kaczyński. Barbara Nowacka, leader of the Polish Initiative (Inicjatywa Polska), a small left-wing party within the current ruling majority, was appointed Minister of Education. Among Nowacka’s past initiatives was a bill on the secularization of the state, which aimed, among other things, to abolish public funding for religious education, arguing that it “lacks a scientific basis.” From the very beginning of her tenure, Nowacka has pursued two main objectives: minimizing the presence of religion in schools and introducing health education (which includes content related to sex education) as a new mandatory subject.

The first regulation amending the rules for organizing religious education was issued by Minister Nowacka on July 26, 2024. The new regulation changed the existing rule, which required schools to organize religious instruction in class groups whenever at least seven students wished to participate. Students from different classes were grouped together if this number was not met. As of September 1, 2024, when the regulation came into effect, such groups can almost always be formed, provided that they do not exceed the maximum limit of 28 students (25 in preschools and the first three grades of elementary school) and that students of vastly different ages are not grouped together (in primary school, students can be grouped into grades I-III, IV-VI, and VII-VIII).

On January 17, 2025, the Minister of Education further amended the 1992 regulation. Beginning on September 1, 2025, the number of weekly religion lessons will be halved (from two hours per week to one), and—with few exceptions—these classes will be scheduled either at the beginning or the end of the school day.

The consequences of this marginalization are not difficult to foresee. Given the optional nature of religion classes, many students will have even more reasons to opt-out, and many religion teachers will face difficulties, with the risk of sudden dismissals (ministerial documents related to these changes mention a potential reduction of around 10,000 jobs). Unsurprisingly, Minister Nowacka’s decisions have sparked strong protests from both ecclesiastical circles and many parents. However, the conflict is not only about the substance of the new regulations but also about the process by which they were drafted. The Ministry offered churches the opportunity to express their opinions on both decrees, but no agreement was reached. On the contrary, the opinions expressed by representatives of the Polish Bishops’ Conference and the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Poland were strongly negative. After the publication of the July 26, 2024 regulation, both ecclesiastical bodies appealed to the Constitutional Tribunal through the President of the Supreme Court, requesting a review of the ministerial provisions’ compliance with higher-ranking legal norms. In its November 27, 2024 ruling, the Tribunal declared the regulation unconstitutional and illegal because it had been issued without prior agreement with Church authorities, as expressly required by the 1991 law and upheld by the logic of constitutional norms. However, the ruling was not published in Poland’s Official Journal (Dziennik Ustaw), and the government has ignored it—much like other Tribunal rulings it considers illegitimate (a stance rooted in the broader context of Poland’s judicial crisis).

Despite various attempts at dialogue between bishops and the Polish government in search of a compromise, the outcome of this situation highlights the ongoing relevance of religious freedom even in Europe, where, unfortunately, “legal norms and administrative practices are growing that “limit or in fact annul the rights formally recognized by the Constitution for individual believers and religious groups” (Pope Francis, Address to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy, 2025).

Thus, the recent international warning from the Holy Father should prompt reflection: religious freedom must be regarded as “an achievement of a sound political and juridical culture, because when it is acknowledged, the dignity of the human person is respected at its root, and the ethos and institutions of peoples are strengthened” (Ibidem).

* Professor of Ecclesiastical Law, Institute of Legal Sciences, Faculty of Law, Canon Law, and Administration, the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland.